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The Insanity Defense Founded on Ethnic
Oppression: Defending the Accused in the
International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia
I.

INTRODUCTION

It appears that to have a non-racist society men must drastically change the nature of their group behavior, and it seems
unlikely that this will be possible until men more fully realize
and better understand their primitive behavior. Only then will
there be a significant decline in the neglect, exploitation, victimization, violence, and death on the massive scale that men
in groups inflict upon outsiders.'
Throughout the final decade of the 20' century, war crimes occurred in
Yugoslavia, prompting the United Nations to establish the International Crimi2
nal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to prosecute war criminals.
The citizenry of the former Yugoslavia was composed primarily of four different ethnic groups (Slovenian, Serbian, Croatian and Muslim), and war crimes
generally consisted of one ethnic group acting out against another. 3 These
crimes, however, compose but the final chapter of the former Yugoslavia, a
country whose entire history was plagued by ethnic factionalism. 4 These factional beliefs not only found support from radical groups uprising against the
oppressive Communist government, 5 but also seethed into the societal fabric
of Yugoslavia. 6 For example, differences in religious beliefs and in customs
7
guiding daily life served to separate people into mutually suspicious groups,
8
each bent on oppressing those who were different. Therefore, Yugoslavian
history, plagued by governmental and societal oppression of various ethnic
1. Charles A. Pinderhughes, M.D., The Origins of Racism, 8 Ir. J. PSYCHIATRY, 934,
940-41 (1969).
2. The United Nations, InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia Home
Page, Fact Sheet, available at http://www.un.org/ictylindex.html. The ICTY was established in
May 1993 to "prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian
law committed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991." Id.
3. See LAURA SILBER & ALLAN LrITE, YUGOSLAVIAL; DEATH OF A NATION 26-7 (TV
Books 1996).
4. See id. at 28-30.
5. See id.
6. See ROBERT D. KAPLAN, BALKAN GHOSTS: A JOURNEY THROUGH HISTORY 25 (St. Martin's Press)(1993).

7. See id.
8. See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
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groups, is the foundation for the culturally-based insanity defense proposed for
the ICTY.
This note argues that evidence of an ethnically oppressive environment
could be used to establish the conventional affirmative defense of insanity, a
defense that concedes having committed the underlying physical act but denies
legal responsibility. "[Ijt cannot be denied that there is a causal connection
between environment and crime."9 Yet, reliance on history is only one requisite of a culturally-based insanity defense.' 0 The defendant must have also
personally experienced individualized acts of ethnic oppression."I Therefore,
as citizens of the former Yugoslavia, the defendants on trial in the ICTY not
only lived in an ethnically factionalized environment, 12 but may have also
experienced individualized acts of discrimination. Taken together, the history
and personal affronts may constitute causal agents for alleged war crimes and
possible justification for an insanity defense. This argument is offered in four
parts.
Part II analyzes the applicable ICTY Statute, Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Rules), and a relevant common law interpretation which together lead
to the conclusion that the insanity defense may be raised in the ICTY. The
ICTY Rules provide for the use of "special defences."' 3 Other than the defense of diminished mental capacity, however, the Rules fail to define special
defences.14 Because of the egregious nature of most war crimes, one interpretation of the statute's ambiguity is that it should be construed narrowly so that
war criminals will be prevented from asserting the insanity defense.' 5 In Prosecutor v. Delalic, however, the ICTY Trial Chamber held that special defences
6
should be construed broadly to include the affirmative defense of insanity.'
Although the insanity defense can be raised, the ICTY has not formalized a
legal standard for the defense.' 7 This lack of a legal test is unfairly prejudicial
to the defendant who must meet the burden of proof in establishing the elements of the defense.' 8 Further, because an insanity defense per se has not
9. PAUL HARRIS, BLACK RAGE CONFRONTS THE LAW 2(New York University
Press)(1997).
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See infra Part I.
13. The United Nations, InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia Home
Page, Basic Legal Documents, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 67 (A)(ii)(b), available
at http://www.un.org/icty/index.html (last amended July 2,1999) [hereinafter "Rules"].
14. See id.
15. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Symposium: Negotiating the Treaty of Rome on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 443, 464 (1999) (speaking
specifically about the lack of limitations on affirmative defenses in the draft statute for the
International Criminal Court).
16. See Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, 1157 (ICTY November 16, 1998)
available at http://www.un.org/icty/index.html.
17. See id. at 1161.
18. See id.at 1159.
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been raised in the ICTY, the possible success for the defense remains open to
judicial interpretation.' 9
Part III provides support from the United States' legal community, offering the black rage defense as a paradigm for the proposed use of the insanity
defense founded on ethnic oppression in the ICTY. The black rage defense
utilizes evidence of a racially oppressive environment to establish the conventional affirmative criminal defense of insanity. 20 The basis for the black rage
defense is the extensive history of racial segregation and discrimination by the
United States' government and its citizens. 2' Striking similarities exist between the segregation of blacks in the United States and the separation of
ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavia. Moreover, for a culturally-based insanity defense such as black rage to be successful, a medical professional must
diagnosis the defendant as mentally ill.22 In addition, several members of the
psychiatric community strongly support the theory that 23extreme racism may
qualify as different medically accepted mental illnesses.
Part IV discusses some implications arising from the use of the insanity
defense by defendants in the ICTY. First, many citizens of the world would
be morally outraged at war criminals adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity. 24 Second, triers-of-fact want to base their verdicts on tangible medical
25
evidence, not what many perceive as the "soft science" of psychiatry. Finally, a culturally based insanity defense is seemingly contradictory to the
crime of genocide, which permits prosecution of acts motivated by cultural
26
bias and hate.
This note concludes that the culturally based insanity defense predicated
on ethnic oppression is a viable legal defense to war crimes prosecuted in the
ICTY. While this assertion may be problematic, 27 nothing in existing legal
doctrine precludes the defense. 2 8 Importantly, defining the legal standard for
an insanity defense in the ICTY is necessary to fully establish it within the
19. In 1999 as the Draft Statute for the Establishment of the International Criminal Court
was in its final stage of negotiation, the potential outcome of the insanity defense in the international legal arena was open to judicial interpretation. Bassiouni, supra note 15, at 464.
20. See Harris, supra note 9, at 5.
21. See id. at 2.
22. See Tosha Yvette Foster, Note: From Fear to Rage: Black Rage as a Natural Progression From and FunctionalEquivalent of Battered Woman Syndrome, 38 Wm and Mary L. Rev.
1851, 1869-70 (1997).
23. See Alvin F. Poussaint, They Hate. They Kill. Are They Insane?, N.Y. TIMES, August
26, 1999, at A17. See also Foster, supra note 21, at 1868-69.
24. See discussion infra Part IV.
25. See discussion infra Part IV.
26. See discussion infra Part IV.
27. See discussion infra Part IV.
28. Patrcia J. Falk, Novel Theories of Criminal Defense Based Upon the Toxicity of the
Social Environment: Urban Psychosis, Television Intoxication, and Black Rage, 74 N.C.L. Rev.
731, 788 (1996).

94
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practice of international criminal law. 29 Unlike the ICTY and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), which were established specifically for
the prosecution of war crimes in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, respectively, 30 the International Criminal Court (ICC) is being formed as a permanent tribunal for international criminal prosecution. 3 1 Therefore, with the
potential for increased criminal prosecution at the international level, precedent established by the ICTY has applicability to international criminal prose32
cution extending well beyond the former Yugoslavia.
II.

Tm NEED FOR A STATUTORY LEGAL STANDARD FOR THE
INSANITY DEFENSE ASSERTED IN THE ICTY

The Trial Chamber 33 held that the insanity defense is a permissible special defence in the ICTY. 34 Rule 67(A)(ii)(b) of the Rules allows for the assertion of special defences, including "diminished or lack of mental
responsibility" (DMR). 35 However, this Rule fails to list prima facie elements
required by the defense. 36 Further, the Rule fails to define other defenses that
qualify as "special," but alludes to the fact that others exist because of the
phrase "any special defence." '37 Furthermore, Rule 2, which provides definitions for terms utilized throughout the Rules, also fails to define special
defences.38 Therefore, the Rules do not specify whether the defense of insanity qualifies as a permissible defense in the ICTY. 39 However, the Trial

Chamber in Delalic held that because the framers of the Rules did not qualify
29. See Sean D. Murphy, Developments in InternationalCriminal Law: Progressand Jurisprudence of the InternationalCriminalTribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 93 A.J.I.L. 57, 9597 (1999).
30. See Panel Discussion: Association ofAmerican Law Schools on the InternationalCriminal Court, 36 Am. Crim. L Rev. 223, 225 (1999).
31. See id. at 227-228.
32. See Murphy, supra note 29, at 95-97.
33. The United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Home
Page, Basic Legal Documents, Statute of the International Tribunal, at art. 21(3), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/index.html (last amended May 13, 1998). Article 12 of the Statute states
that the ICTY Chambers will be composed of eleven judges, each required to be from a different State. See id. at art. 12. Article 12(a) states that three of the eleven judges will preside at
each trial. See id. at art. 12(a).
34. See Delalic, supra note 16, at 1157.
35. See Rules, supra note 13, at Rule 67(A)(ii)(b); See also Greg Steinmetz, Her Way: A
Daughter-in-LawOf 'Old Blue Eyes' Takes a Tough Case, The WALL ST. J., July 8, 1999 at A1.
Defense attorney, Cynthia Sinatra, utilized diminished mental responsibility, a variation of the
insanity defense, to defend war criminal Ezad Landzo in the ICTY. See id. (With diminished
mental responsibility, Landzo asserted that he was unable to prevent his criminal actions because of the circumstances of war.) See id.
36. See Delalic, supra note 16, at 1157.
37. See id.; Rules, supra note 13, at Rule 67.
38. See Rules, supra note 13, at Rule 2; Delalic, supra note 16, at 1157.
39. See Delalic, supra note 16, at 1157.
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or define special defences in Rules 2 and 67, the term should be construed
40
broadly to include the insanity defense.
Although the insanity defense can be asserted, the Rules fail to provide a
standard of review for the defense. 4' A standard is needed so that a defendant
can meet the burden of proof required under Rule 67.42 This Rule of "Reciprocal Disclosure" details what information both the prosecutor and defense
must supply to one another prior to the commencement of trial. 43 Rule
67(A)(ii)(b) states that the defense must notify the prosecutor of any plan to
assert a special defence and offer any evidence that the defendant plans to
utilize in establishing the defense." Therefore, special defences are affirmative defenses in which the defendant bears the burden of proof at trial. 45 The
lack of a legal standard of review is unduly prejudicial to the defendant in
attempting to meet the burden. For example, in Delalic, the defense asserted
the DMR special defence and petitioned the Trial Chamber to provide an applicable standard that would permit them to successfully meet the burden of
proof.46 Defense counsel further contended that the absence of a specific legal
test prejudiced the accused pursuant to Articles 20(1), 21(b) and 21(e) of the
Statute of the International Tribunal. 47 These Articles guarantee the rights of
the accused, such as the right to have adequate time and facilities in defense
preparation. 48 The Trial Chamber found that although a standard was not
clearly defined in the Rules, other national legal systems had articulated standards to follow. 4 9 Furthermore, the Rules allowed the Trial Chamber to rely
50
on such national legal systems to explain the concept at issue.
The Trial Chamber in Delalic focused primarily on Section 2 of England's Homicide Act of 195751 and noted that the English test permitted sentence reduction if a DMR defense was successful, but did not permit outright
acquittal. 52 The Chamber applied the English test in Delalic and concluded
that a finding of DMR reduces the offense degree or sentence but does not act
as a complete defense. 5 3 The Chamber further stated, however, that Rule
67(A)(ii)(b) is ambiguous and, without qualification or limitation, leaves un40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id.
id.at 1159 and 1161.
id. at 1159.
Rules, supra note 13, at Rule 67.
id.
id.; see also Delalic, supra note 16, at 1158.
Delalic, supra note 16, at 1159.
id.
id.
id. at 1161.
id.
id. at 1163.
id. at 1165.
id. at 11160-72.
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resolved the issue of whether other special defences, such as insanity, could be
54
viewed as complete defenses resulting in acquittal.
Since the insanity defense per se has not been asserted in the ICTY, further analysis of the DMR defense in Delalic is beneficial in understanding
why a separate standard for insanity is required. The defenses of DMR and
insanity are based upon abnormality of the mind and both are special defences
under the Rules. 55 The DMR defense requires the essential element that the
accused's mental abnormality of mind substantially impaired his ability to
control his (alleged criminal) actions.5 6 Similar to England, courts in the
United States that adopted a DMR defense permit mitigation of punishment or
offense rather than outright acquittal if a DMR defense prevails. 57 Yet, many
United States' courts permit the verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity if an
insanity defense prevails. 58 Thus, unlike a DMR defense, a defendant's
mental abnormality in an insanity defense negates criminal intent, thereby negating the defendant's legal responsibility for the crime.
United States' courts generally apply one of two different standards to
insanity defenses. 59 The M'Naghten standard is applied by United States' federal courts and approximately half of the state courts. 60 This test requires that
at the time of the alleged criminal conduct, the defendant's mental disease
prevented him from knowing "the nature and quality of the act he was doing"
or that "he did not know [what] he was doing was wrong."' 6' The Model Penal
62
Code Test (MPG) is applied by about half of United States' state courts.
This test requires that at the time of the alleged criminal conduct, the defendant's mental abnormality caused him to lack "substantial capacity either to
appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct or to conform his con'63
duct to the requirements of law."
As the United States embraced a distinction between DMR and insanity, 64 so should the ICTY. A defendant who was legally insane while committing the alleged criminal act did not presumptively know that what he was
doing was wrong as required by the DMR defense. 65 Even the Trial Chamber
in Delalic held that the application of England's Homicide Act to a DMR
54.
55.
56.
57.

See
See
See
See

58. See

id. at 911164.
id. at 1156; See infra Part II.
Delalic, supra note 16, at 1156.
infra Part MI; Harris, supra note 9, at 134-35.
WAYNE

R.

LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW

329, 350 (West Publishing Co. 3d ed.

2000)(1972).
59. See id.
60. See id.; Harris, supra note 9, at 133-34.

61. BLACK'S LAw DiCTIONARY 694 (6th ed. 1991).
62. See LAFAVE, supra note 58, at 350.
63. BLACK'S, supra note 61, at 545.
64. See infra pp. 7-8.
65. See Delalic, supra note 16, at 1156.
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defense is not in pari materia66 to the provisions of Article 4 of the MPC that
provide for the "not guilty by reason of insanity verdict." 67 This reference to
the MPC test leaves open the possibility that the Trial Chamber could apply a
standard other than that of the English Homicide Act to an insanity defense
asserted in the ICTY.
In conclusion, the Trial Chamber's interpretation of Rule 67(A)(ii)(b)
permits the assertion of the insanity defense in the ICTY. Yet without a clear
standard, the accused is unduly prejudiced in the presentation of the defense,
attempting to meet an unknown burden. The inclusion of an insanity defense
would be a substantial step in establishing the rights of the defendants in the
emerging arena of international criminal justice. Therefore, the ICTY must
amend the Rules to include a specific standard of review. Either the
M'Naghten or the MPC test as utilized by courts within the United States
would be an appropriate standard.
Il.

SUPPORT FROM THE LEGAL COMMUNITY:

BLACK RAGE DEFENSE IN THE

APPLICATION OF THE

ICTY

The black rage defense in the United States has gained some acceptance
by American legal scholars as a valid type of insanity defense. 68 The basis for
the black rage defense is the history of racial segregation and discrimination in
the United States. 6 9 A comparative analysis of the histories of the United
States and the former Yugoslavia, presented in Part A below, shows that the
governments of both countries created and ratified ethnic segregation. Part B
below analyzes the black rage defense in the United States and offers its theoretical underpinnings as a basis for the use of the insanity defense predicated
on ethnic oppression proposed for the ICTY.
A.

HistoricalGovernmental Oppression in the United States and in the
Former Yugoslavia

1. The Segregated United States of America
Racial segregation in the United States was initiated because white colo70
nists, believing that blacks were their property, denied blacks their freedom.
From the United States' inception, the Constitution protected this system of
slavery. Article I, Section 2 declared a slave to be only three-fifths of one
1171. "Statutes 'in pari materia' are those relating to the same person or
BLACK'S, supra note 61, at 544.
67. See Delalic, supra note 16, at 1171.
68. See Harris, supra note 9, at 5. Black rage is "part of a growing body of recognized
criminal defenses that have forced the courts to consider the effects of environmental hardship."
Id.
69. See id. at 30-36. "Lawyers and the language they use are bound by their historical
circumstances." Id. at 31. The civil rights movement of the 1960's allowed for the admission
into the courtroom of reality evidence of the cumulative effects that slavery and segregation had
on blacks. See id. at 30-36.
70. WILLIAM H. GRIER & PRICE M. COBBS, BLACK RAGE, 25-26 & 32. (Basic Books 1968).
66. See id. at

thing or having a common purpose."
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white person, thereby denying blacks congressional representation. 7 1 Article
I, Section 9 gave Congress plenary power over the slave trade but prevented
Congress from banning the slave trade until 1808, thereby granting the South
at least twenty more years of slavery .72 Article V protected the slave trade via
Article I, Section 9.73 Finally, Article IV, Section 2, the "fugitive slave law,"
74
required slaves that escaped to a free state be sent back to the slave state.
Slavery was the primary catalyst of the Civil War, fought between 1861
and 1865.75 The North prevailed over the South, 7 6 and the 13th Amendment
solidified the abolition of slavery.7 7 Furthermore, the 14th Amendment, ratified in 1868, granted United States citizenship to all persons born or naturalized in the United States.7 8 Thereby overruling Dred Scott v. Sandford, the
Supreme Court case which held that free black people, like slaves, were not
79
citizens.
Although the Civil War and constitutional amendments laid the groundwork for racial equality in the United States, segregation remained the law of
the United States. The 1896 decision of Plessy v. Ferguson sustained a Louisiana law that required separate train accommodations for white passengers
apart from black passengers. 80 The majority's reasoning was that, "[I]f one
race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the United States
cannot put them upon the same plane. ' 81 The "separate but equal" doctrine of
Plessy was the law for almost 60 years. 82 Finally, the Court's decision in
Brown v. Board of Education in 1954 held that segregation by race in public
schools violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. 83 Therefore, only as recently as the 1960's were racially discriminatory laws finally
overruled.8 4 Although discrimination is no longer legal, the evil of racial seg85
regation and discrimination still permeates the United States culture today.
71. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
73. U.S. CONST. art. V.
74. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.
75. See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, ORDEAL BY FIRE, VOLUME II, THE CIVIL WAR, 260, 488
(McGraw-Hill, Inc. 2d ed. 1993) (1982).
76. See id. at 488.
77. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
78. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The 14th Amendment also granted to all persons born or
naturalized in the United States citizenship in the State wherein they reside. See id.
79. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 452-454 (1856).
80. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.537, 550-551 (1896).
81. Id. at 552.
82. See Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 490-491(1954).
83. See id. at 495.
84. See discussion infra Part III.A.1.
85. In Texas in 1998, for example, three white supremacists dragged a black man to his
death. See Rick Lyman, February21-27; A Guilty Verdict In Texas Dragging Death, N.Y.
TIMES, February 28, 1999.
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The Divided Yugoslavia

The first Yugoslavian State was created after World War 1.86 Upon its
formation, it was called the "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. '' 87 In
1929, it was renamed Yugoslavia. 88 The Serbian Karadjordjevic dynasty ruled
Yugoslavia as a monarchy, but the government soon evolved into a dictatorship. 89 In 1941, the Axis powers invaded and gained control of Yugoslavia. 90
Four years later, the Soviet Army liberated most of Eastern Europe. Josip
Broz, known as Tito, rose to power and led Yugoslavia in its pursuit of independence. 9' Although Tito was initially loyal to Communist Russia, Moscow
viewed Tito's aggressiveness and independence as a danger, fearing he could
potentially conquer the eastern bloc. Thus, Communist Russia liberated Yugoslavia from the eastern bloc in 1948.92
Similar to the racial segregation in the United States, ethnic segregation
fueled primarily by differences in religion occurred in Yugoslavia. 9 3 Based
upon the ethnic differences, Yugoslavia was divided into eight regions: the six
republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia
and Slovenia; and the two provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. 94 Tito was
concerned that the largest religious population, the Eastern Orthodox Serbs,
could successfully conquer the second largest religious population, the Catholic Croats. 95 If a resurgence of nationalism appeared from within any religious
group, Tito simply exiled or jailed those nationalists and kept the balance
amongst the republics and provinces. 96 Therefore, although these exiled communities nurtured nationalist beliefs which formed a fertile breeding ground
for extreme ethnic oppression, Tito's rule suppressed the emergence of harm97
ful effects caused by decentralization.
Comparable to the United States' government ratifying racial segregation
in both the United States Constitution and in subsequent Supreme Court decisions, 98 Tito promulgated Yugoslavia's constitution of 1974. 99 The 1974 constitution created a new federal parliament that consisted of ten separate
Communist Parties: one for each of the six republics; one for each of the two
provinces; one for federal Yugoslavia; and one for the Army.' °° As public
SILBER & LITTE, supra note 3, at 28.
87. See id.
88. See id. See also, WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY, 1551 (3d college ed. 1988).
89. SILBER & LITrLE, supra note 3, at 28.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See KAPLAN, supra note 6, at 25.
94. See SILBER & LITTLE, supra note 3, at 26, 29.
95. See id. at 28-29.
96. See id. at 29.
97. See id.
98. See discussion infra Part III.A.1.
99. See SILBER & LIT'LE, supra note 3, at 29.
100. See id.

86.

100
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facilities in the United States were segregated on the basis of color, I0 ' the
Yugoslavian constitution gave all six republics and both provinces a separate
bank, police, educational and judicial system. 0 2 Because he had no heir apparent, 10 3 Tito intended that this new parliamentary system would replace his
rule and continue the balance of power that he achieved.' °4
Upon Tito's death in 1980, however, the balance of power began disintegrating.' 0 5 Yugoslavians of different ethnic groups began living peacefully
07
together, 0 6 as racial groups in the United States did in the late 20"' century.1
Yet, unlike in the United States, the ever-present factionalists in Yugoslavia
gained power because Tito's rule no longer suppressed their quest for an ethnically pure Yugoslavia. 10 8 The nucleus of Yugoslavia's demise was the ethnically mixed Kosovo.' 0 9 Ethnic Kosovo Albanians began publicly protesting
and demanding that Kosovo become the seventh republic. "10 As the Yugoslav
Army crushed the Albanians, a group of Kosovo Serbs began to organize."'
Serbian nationalists secretly backed the Kosovo Serbs, and in 1986 the Serbian
government began openly supporting them.' 1 2 "[O]fficial Serbia began its
headlong and ultimately disastrous descent into nationalism. It tapped a rich
seam of national grievance, officially stifled but privately nurtured for decades."' '3 Tito's greatest fear, that the Serbians would dominate the Croats,'14
came to fruition.' '5
On April 24, 1987, Ivan Stambolic, Serbian President, sent Slobodan
Milosevic, a Serbian party leader, to Kosovo in support of the Kosovo
Serbs. 1 6 Milosevic, who gained power amongst the masses, was heralded as
the icon of the Serbian movement in Kosovo, and in September of 1987, over101. See Plessy, supra note 80, at 348-349 (holding that "separate but equal" public accommodations for blacks and whites were constitutional under the 14th Amendment of the United
States Constitution).
102. See SILBER & LIITLE, supra note 3, at 34.
103. See id. at 29.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See NOEL MALCOLM, BOSNIA; A SHORT HISTORY 234-235 (New York University Press
1994). The province of Bosnia, for example, was comprised of Muslims, Serbs and Croats. See
id. So "kaleidoscopically intermingled" were the Serbs and Croats, they identified with "two
ethnic fatherlands." Id.
107. The abolishment of de jure racial segregation and the civil rights movement culminated
in a complete racial integration of public facilities in the United States. See Brown, supra note
82, at 494-495.
108. See Silber & Little, supra note 3, at 31.
109. See id. at 34.
110. See id.
111. See id. at 34-35.
112. See id. at 35.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 28-29.
115. See id. at 47.
116. See id. at 37.
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threw Stambolic, becoming the new Serbian President." 17 Milosevic began a
Serbian nationalist campaign to ethnically cleanse Yugoslavia of all people
who were not Serbian."1 8 Upon winning the war in Kosovo, Milosevic directed his crusade at Bosnia, another ethnically mixed republic. 1 9 By 1994,
the Serbs seized seventy percent of Bosnia, while the Muslims and Croats
12 0
were fighting for the rest.
The international community responded cautiously and slowly with efforts to regain peace in Yugoslavia. In 1995, after several ineffective UNinitiated peace negotiations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
instituted the first meaningful peace advancement that combined negotiations
and military force.' 2 ' The UN established the ICTY in 1993 to prosecute individuals who allegedly committed acts in violation of international law within
the territory of Yugoslavia since 1991.122 Many individuals were prosecuted,
2 3
and many others are still awaiting trial.'
B.

Resultant Social Disparities and the Emergence of the Insanity Defense
Predicated on Ethnic Oppression

1. The Black Rage Defense in the United States
The black rage defense utilizes evidence of a racially oppressive environment to establish the more conventional affirmative criminal defense of insanity. This defense has two components. 124 First, a black defendant raises
the defense when oppressive environmental factors act as a causal agent in the
commission of a crime against a white individual. 2 5 Therefore, the history of
racial oppression of blacks by whites in the United States is the basis for the
black rage defense. 126 De jure acceptance of slavery and subsequent racial
segregation resulted in modem-day oppression of blacks, via "police brutality,
job and housing discrimination, and a denial of educational opportunities" to
name a few. 127 "[T]he whip of the plantation was replaced by the boundaries
of the ghetto." 128 Second, the defendant must have also personally experienced concrete, individualized instances of racial discrimination.129 Mere re117. See id. at 37-40.
118. See MALCOLM, supra note 106, at 246.
119. See id. at 319.
120. See SILBER & LrITLE, supra note 3, at 319.
121. See id. at 355-364.
122. ICTY Homepage, supra note 2, at Fact Sheet.
123. See id. As of August 9, 2001, 16 accused are at a pre-trial stage, 10 accused are currently standing trial, 6 accused are awaiting judgments from the Trial Chamber, 12 appeals are
pending, and 6 accused have been sentenced. See id.
124. See Harris, supra note 9, at 2.
125. See id.
126. See id.

127. See GRIER & COBBS, supra note 70, at 29.
128. Id. at 26.
129. See Harris, supra note 9, at 4.
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liance on the general history of racial oppression fails to meet the requisite for
130
the black rage defense.
Although recently coined as a new "abuse excuse," a black rage defense
has never asserted that a history of oppression justifies criminal acts by blacks
against whites. 131 Furthermore, the black rage defense is not synonymous
with a race hatred defense.132 This misconception was fueled by cases such as
the Colin Ferguson case. Colin Ferguson, a black man, killed six individuals
and wounded nineteen people on a train in 1993.133 Ferguson blamed racial
oppression for his problematic life and therefore committed his crime on a
Long Island commuter train, rather than a Manhattan train, out of respect for
then Mayor David Dinkins. 134 Based on these facts, his initial defense team
planned to assert a black rage defense. 35 Yet, the press and pundits incorrectly depicted the defense as an attempt to use racial hatred to justify black on
36
white violence.1
Although the term "black rage" was not yet recognized, the black rage
defense was first asserted in the trial of William Freeman in 1846.137 Freeman
was wrongly imprisoned for five years for horse stealing.1 38 Upon release
from prison, he sought a job on the Van Nest farm, owned by a prominent
white family. 139 Although he was politely refused the job, Freeman later returned and killed the entire family. 140 The heart of Freeman's defense was
that oppressive social conditions, including wrongful conviction of a crime
solely because of his race, caused his insanity.14' Although the jury found him
guilty, three judges of the New York State Supreme Court reversed the conviction citing four errors of law committed by the trial court. 142 Freeman tragically died in jail before a new trial could be held. 143 His case, however,
triumphantly brought "racist reality into the courtroom," something the justice
system would not see again until 1932 in Powell v. Alabama' 44 and then not
145
again until the civil rights movement of the 1960's.
In 1971, the first modern day assertion of the black rage theory of defense
was successfully advanced in the trial of James Johnson, Jr. 14 6 Johnson was a
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

See id. at 2.
See id. at 6.
See id. at 5.
See id. at 5-6.
See id. at 154-156.
See id. at 155.
See id.
See id. at 9, 19.
See id. at 10-11.
See id. at 13.
See id. at 13-14.
See id. at 19.
See id. at 27, 29.
See id. at 30.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
See Harris, supra note 9, at 30.
See id. at 36.
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black man raised on a Mississippi plantation. 14 7 His entire family lived in a
two-room shanty without adequate food or clothing.' 48 In an effort to better
49 In
his life, he moved to Michigan and found work in an automotive plant.'
the plant, blacks worked under extremely unsafe working conditions, which
they called "niggermation."' 150 Race relations between black workers and
white supervisors were volatile. 15 1 Throughout years of dedicated employment, Johnson was repeatedly refused promotion and threatened with loss of
53
his job.' 52 After a final threat of termination, he killed two white foremen.
Although the term black rage per se had not yet been utilized, "the defense
established,"
rooted in the anger and despair produced by racism was 1 clearly
54
and Johnson was found not guilty by reason of insanity.
Besides the legal theory grounding the defense as one of insanity, medical support is needed to prove or characterize the black rage defendant's
psyche as a form of mental illness.' 55 William H. Grier and Price M. Cobbs,
two black psychologists, coined the term "black rage" in their book, Black
Rage, published in 1968.156 Black Rage examined the psychological state of
blacks in the United States' 57 and asserted that beginning with slavery and
furthered by segregationist laws, black Americans hold a cultural paranoia of
whites.' 5 8 According to Grier and Cobbs, holding a "healthy" cultural paranoia is essential for blacks to exist in America.159 Yet, some blacks understandably hold an unhealthy paranoia and suffer from fear of "nonexistent
when
dangers everywhere." 160 Therefore, the black rage defense is applicable
61
a black person kills a white person who he perceives as a threat.'
Although organizations such as the American Psychiatric Association do
not recognize black rage as a mental disorder, some voices within the medical
community have begun to state the opposite. 162 Black rage has been linked to
psychosis and paranoia, two legally cognizable predicate symptoms of insanity. 16 3 Support also exists that black rage meets the criteria for delusional
disorder, a major psychiatric illness included in the Diagnostic and Statistical
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

See id. at 86.
See id.
See id. at 86, 87.
See id.
See id. at 89.
See id. at 90-92.
See id. at 92.
See id. at 111.
Foster, supra note 22, at 1870-71.
See id. at 1866 (citing GRIER & COBBS, supra note 70).
See id. at 1866-67 (citing GRIER & COBBS, supra note 70, at 161).
See id. at 1867(citing GRIER & COBBS, supra note 70, at 161).
See id.
See id.
See id.
Poussaint, supra note 23, at A17. See also Foster, supra note 22, at 1868-69.
Foster, supra note 22, at 1870.
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Manual of Mental Disorders, an index of mental illnesses published by the
American Psychiatric Association.' 64
In The Pathology of Race Prejudice, the author contends that "behavior
motivated by race prejudice shows precisely the same characteristics as that
ascribed to insanity." 165 The distinction is made between insanity caused by
"abnormalities of the structure of the brain" or dementia, the more socially
acceptable causation, and insanity as an acquired psychological reaction, the
category to which black rage is ascribed. 166 Because tangible scientific evidence cannot prove racism,' 67 established psychological hypotheses must be
offered as proof that race prejudice is an acquired psychological reaction, not
an organically based pathology, qualifying as insanity. 168 At trial, this proof
would be offered by mental expert defense witnesses whose testimony would
be used to establish that the black rage defense is a viable legal defense that
69
warrants finding the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity.'
2.

The Insanity Defense in the ICTY

Proponents of the black rage defense argue that it need not be limited to
black defendants in United States' courts but should be expanded to include
different ethnic groups.' 70 For example, one such expansion is the "cultural
defense" that relies on social customs and beliefs to explain the defendant's
criminal act.17 1 In the California case People v. Wu, the defendant murdered
her son and attempted suicide when she learned that her Chinese American
husband had committed adultery and mistreated their son. 172 The defense asserted a "cultural defense" arguing that two predominant beliefs of Chinese
culture influenced her crime. 173 First, the belief that humiliation and shame
plague victims of adultery and child abuse. 174 Second, many Chinese hold a
strong belief in the afterlife. 175 Therefore, out of shame, the defendant killed
her child and intended to commit suicide so that they could reunite in a better
environment.' 76 The Court of Appeals reversed a second-degree murder conviction because the jury had not been instructed to consider cultural evidence
in reaching its verdict.' 77 At the second trial, the cultural evidence resulted in
164. Poussaint, supra note 23, at Al.
165. E. Franklin Frazier, The Pathology of Race Prejudice, in THE BLACK SOCIOLOGISTS:
THE FIRST HALF CENTURY 82 (John Bracey et al. eds., 1971).
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See id.
See WEBSTER'S, supra note 88, at 1106.

See Foster, supra note 22, at 1870.
See id.

170. Harris, supra note 9, at 228.

171. See id. at 241.
172. See id. at 246.
173. See id.
174. See id.

175. See id.
176. See id.

177. See id. at 246-47.
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a conviction on the lesser charge of manslaughter.' 78 Therefore, in United
States courts, evidence of cultural differences has been successfully used to
establish an environmentally-based or "cultural defense."
This cultural component combined with the theoretical underpinnings of
the black rage defense should be extended to the ICTY as a form of the insanity defense. This extension is justified on several accounts. First, the Yugoslavian government created and ratified the separation of Yugoslavians on
the basis of their ethnicity.' 79 Second, this de jure separation reinforced divisions based on religious differences. The two primary religions in Yugoslavia
were Eastern Orthodoxy and Western Catholicism.1 80 This divide can be distinguished as even greater than the difference between Catholicism and Protestantism or even Catholicism and Judaism because all three of these religions,
unlike Orthodoxy, developed in the West.' 8' For example, Eastern religions
emphasize "beauty and magic" with church services encapsulating "physical
re-creation[s] of heaven on earth."' 1 82 In stark contrast, "ideas and deeds" are
emphasized by Western religions. 183 Over centuries, such differing viewpoints of religion produced conflicting approaches to daily life amongst the
Yugoslavians.' 84 For example, Eastern Orthodox Serbian weddings last four
days, providing enough time for celebration, prayers and feasting. 18 5 However, Western Catholic Croatian weddings last only one day. 186 Three additional days of festivity was viewed by the Croats as extravagant and an excuse
by the Serbs to avoid work.' 8 7 Likewise, Croats viewed serving time in the
188
army as wasting time that should be spent working hard to earn a living."'
89
The Croats viewed the Serbs' partiality for military service as illogical.
Because government decree and religious beliefs polarized groups, it logically follows that individuals living in this environment personally experienced acts of ethnic oppression as well. Some historians reject the argument
that these differences motivated the Yugoslavian conflict of the 1990's because different ethnic groups lived peacefully together after Tito's death.' 90
Noel Malcolm in his book Bosnia - A Short History contends that, "The atrocities in Bosnia in 1992 were not committed by old men, or even by young
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

See id.
See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
KAPLAN, supra note 6, at 25.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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id.
id.
id.
id.
id.

190. See Malcolm, supra note 106, at 252. Malcolm argues that the Yugoslavian war crimes
of the late 20th century were motivated only for political and military reasons, not ethnic reasons. See id.
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Bosnians nursing grudges."' 19 1 Instead, "[t]he pattern was set by young urban
gangsters... carry[ing] out a rational strategy dictated by their political leaders
- a method carefully calculated to drive out two ethnic populations and radicalize a third."' 192 Yet, even Malcolm contends that he can understand why Bosnian Serbs came to believe that they were under threat by other ethnic
groups. 193 He cites television as the primary medium used to radicalize the
common Serbs, making the parallel to television broadcasts in the United
States if dominated by the Ku Klux Klan. 194 Malcolm analogizes that if
Americans repetitively heard ethnically based jargon sputtered by David
95
Duke, for example, Americans, too, would have civil war in five years.
Therefore, via the David Duke analogy, Malcolm infers that justification exists
196
for ethnically motivated crimes.
In conclusion, ethnic groups within the former Yugoslavia experienced
historical, governmental and societal oppression in a manner analogous to the
experiences of blacks in the United States. In addition, it is logical to assume
that individual Yugoslavians experienced personal affronts as a result of living
in an ethnically factionalized environment. This environment parallels the
conditions in the United States from which the black rage defense evolved.
Therefore, the insanity defense based on ethnic oppression is a viable option
for defendants in the ICTY.
IV.

ANTICIPATED OUTCOME IN THE

ICTY

Potential obstacles may frustrate the successful application of the insanity
defense founded on ethnic oppression in the ICTY. One such obstacle is that
juries have viewed the black rage defense as a mere excuse that fails to justify
the crime. 197 Consequently, this defense has been largely unsuccessful although nothing in United States' legal doctrine precludes the recognition of an
insanity defense based on the causal agent of racism.1 98 The problem resides
with juries that are at odds with their own moral beliefs. 199 This obstacle is
potentially more veritable when punishment for heinous war crimes are being
decided. Similar to United States law, the ICTY Rules permit the insanity
defense and presume a defendant innocent until proven guilty. 2°0 However,
the ICTY is distinguished from the United States because jurors do not render
191. Id.

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
This obstacle is common to the insanity defense per se. See Michael L. Perlin, "The

Borderline Which Separated You From Me": The Insanity Defense, The Authoritatian Spirit,
The Fear of Faking, and The Culture of Punishment, 82 Iowa L. Rev. 1375, 1407-08 (1997).
198. Falk, supra note 28, at 788.
199. See id.
200. See discussion infra Part II; See Statute, supra note 33, at art. 21(3).

2001]

THE INSANITY DEFENSE

verdicts. 20 1 Instead, trial chambers composed of three judge panels render
judgments. 20 2 Judges, unlike jurors, may more objectively consider the insanity defense and follow the law despite challenges the defense might impose
on their moral beliefs.
A second obstacle is the inability of medical experts to provide tangible
scientific evidence that racism causes mental disorder. 20 3 Juries want such
evidence and not merely a hypothesis put forth by a medical expert. 2 04 Judges
should give more credence to psychiatric studies that conclude ethnic hatred is
a mental illness. These studies are not merely conjecture. 20 5 Rather, they are
substantiated by applying medically accepted scientific methods to the analy20 6
sis of racially based societies and result in scientifically valid diagnoses.
A third obstacle is the apparent disparity between an insanity defense
justified by ethnic oppression and the ICTY crime of genocide. Under the
ICTY Statute, the crime of genocide is the committing of various criminal acts
"with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. ' ' 20 7 Admittedly contradictory, my thesis is arguing that the mental

intent necessary for genocide also qualifies as a component of the proposed
defense to said crime. Instead of punishing acts motivated by ethnic differences, the ICTY should consider that these differences may not formulate
criminal intent. Rather, when experienced in the context of oppression and
fear, ethnic differences may help to formulate a mental illness.

201. See id at art. 12, 12(a). Article 12 of the Statute states that the ICTY chambers will be
composed of eleven judges, each required to be from a different State. See id at art. 12. Article
12(a) states that each Trial Chamber will be composed of three judges. See id at art. 12(a).
202. See id.
203. See infra Part V.
204. See Perlin, supra note 197, at 1408. One myth of the insanity defense is that "[a] fear
that the soft, exculpatory sciences of psychiatry and psychology, claiming expertise in almost all
areas of behavior, will somehow overwhelm the criminal justice system by thwarting the system's crime control component." Id.
205. See Foster, supra note 22, at 1870; See Pouissant, supra note 23, at A17.
206. See Foster, supra note 22, at 1870; See Pouissant, supra note 23, at A17.
207. See Statute, supra note 33, at art. 4. Acts that can equate to the crime of genocide
include: killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm, deliberately inflicting conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, imposing measures intended to prevent births, forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. See id.
Besides genocide, three other crimes can be prosecuted in the ICTY (grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949; violations of the laws or customs of war; and crimes against
humanity). See id. at arts. 2, 3, and 5.
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CONCLUSION

The insanity defense founded on ethnic oppression is a viable defense in
the ICTY. Two arguments contribute to this conclusion. First, the Trial
Chamber in Delalic held that insanity is a permissible special defence under
the Statute and Rules. 20 8 However, a standard of review for said defense has
not been established.2 0 9 This lack of a standard is unfairly prejudicial to the
defendant in attempting to meet the burden of proof. 210 The M'Naghten or
be adopted as the legal test
MPC test, utilized by United States' courts, 2should
11
for insanity defenses asserted in the ICTY.
Second, the black rage defense asserted in United States' courts, provides
a paradigm for the use of the insanity defense predicated on ethnic oppression
in the ICTY. 212 Parallels between the histories and cultures of the United
States and the former Yugoslavia with respect to blacks and ethnic groups,
respectively, support the applicability of the black rage defense, namely that
cultural oppressions play a role in motivating criminal behavior. 21 3 Further
approval of this defense derives from some members of the United States'
2 14
psychiatric community who have concluded that racism is a mental illness.
The success with which the ICTY defines the standard for the insanity
defense and recognizes the validity of environmental and cultural causation of
crime will have consequences that extend beyond the boundaries of the former
Yugoslavia. 2 15 Specifically, precedents of the ICTY may influence the mission of the proposed ICC: a permanent tribunal dedicated to the prosecution of
crime at the international level.2 16 Therefore, the insanity defense founded on
ethnic oppression is a viable defense in the ICTY not only to defend the accused in the former Yugoslavia but also to establish a viable defense within
international criminal justice.
Jennifer L. Larkin*
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